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Canada's Approach to Eradicating
Workplace Sexual Harassment: The
Canadian Supreme Court's Janzen v.
Platy Enterprises Ltd. and Its
Relationship to the United States Supreme
Court's Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
JOSEPH M. PELLICCIOTTI*
[T]he aim.., is not to impose strict rules of proper conduct upon
society, or to interfere in personal relations, but rather to recall
that human beings are equal in worth and dignity, and therefore
owe one another mutual respect.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the general nature and scope of Canadian
law prohibiting workplace sexual harassment. First, it reviews Can-
ada's constitutional protection of equal rights in the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"). 2 The constitutional review
focuses upon the rights enumerated in section 15 of the Charter and
the Charter's general application to governmental and private enti-
ties. 3 Next, this Article outlines Canada's federal, territorial, and pro-
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1. COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE DU QUtBEC, GUIDELINES OF THE COM-
MISSION DES DROIT DE LA PERSONNE DU QUItBEC IN MATTERS RESPECTING HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE, Res. No. COM-297-5 (Oct. 9, 1987) (translation from French) (referring
to Qu6bec's goal of reducing harassment in the workplace).
2. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms) [hereinafter Charter].
3. This Article does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the Canadian Constitution.
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vincial legislative prohibitions against workplace sex discrimination,
particularly sexual harassment. It reviews the judiciary's findings that
sexual harassment violates Canada's anti-sex discrimination laws.
Additionally, it examines the development of United States case law
on the issue of sexual harassment and highlights the general influence
of United States law on Canadian sexual harassment legal develop-
ments. This Article focuses on the Canadian Supreme Court's 1989
landmark sexual harassment decision in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises
Ltd.4 and its relationship to the United States Supreme Court's first
sexual harassment decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 5
II. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EQUAL RIGHTS
A. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' Guarantee of
Equal Rights
The Charter is Canada's contemporary legal statement of the
principle of equal protection of the law. This relatively recent enact-
ment 6 revised the Canadian Constitution and guaranteed various enu-
merated rights.7 Section 15(1) of the Charter provides: "Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical
disability."s
Similar to the United States Constitution,9 the Canadian Consti-
tution, including the Charter, preempts provisional law. It provides:
"The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to
Rather, it notes the general reach of section 15 of the Charter and provides necessary back-
ground to the discussion of anti-sex discrimination legislation and relevant case decisions.
4. 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989) (Can.).
5. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff'g Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'g 23
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
6. The Charter went into effect in 1982. See Charter, supra note 2.
7. For an excellent analysis of Canadian constitutionalism and the Constitution Act,
1982, see Ronald I. Cheffins & Patricia A. Johnson, The Nature of Constitutions and Constitu-
tionalism, in THE REVISED CANADIAN CONSTITUTION: POLITICS AS LAW (1986), reprinted in
PAUL W. Fox & GRAHAM WHITE, POLITICS: CANADA 81 (6th ed. 1987).
8. Charter, supra note 2, § 15(1). Section 15(2) of the Charter protects affirmative ac-
tion programs from attack by providing: "Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, col-
our, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability." Id. § 15(2).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."' 0
B. Application of the Charter
1. Application to All Canadian Governments
Section 32(1) of the Charter provides that the Charter shall
apply:
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect to all
matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect to
all matters within the authority of the legislature of each
province. "
The Charter encompasses the federal, provincial, and territorial legis-
latures, as well as the executive and administrative branches of these
governments. ' 2
2. No Application to Purely Private Conduct
The Canadian Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Charter does not reach purely private action.1 3 In a recent discussion,
the Court used the United States as an example in explaining the rea-
sons for the government action limitation on the reach of the Charter:
The exclusion of private activity from the Charter was not a result
10. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII, § 52(1). Unlike the United States
Constitution, the Charter contains a "notwithstanding" provision that allows the federal or
provincial legislatures to declare that a law "shall operate notwithstanding a provision in-
cluded in section 2 [Fundamental Freedoms] or sections 7 through 15 [Legal Rights and
Equality Rights]" of the Charter. Charter, supra note 2, § 33(1). Any such declarations of
exception are limited to a five-year period. Id. § 33(3). A declaration may then be re-enacted
for another five-year period. Id. § 33(4). Only Qu6bec has taken advantage of this exception
opportunity. See Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, S.Q., ch. 21, § 1 (1982) (Que.)
(amending R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 118) (1977) (Que.). However, this exception is no longer part of
Qu6bec's Charter.
11. Charter, supra note 2, § 32(1). Section 32(2) of the Charter provides an exception to
the effective date of section 15: "Notwithstanding subsection (1) [of section 32], section 15
shall not have effect until three years after this section comes into force" (Le., three years after
the Charter proclamation date of April 17, 1982). Id § 32(2).
12. Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573, 574 (Can.).
13. See id.; see also Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.); Operation Dismantle
Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R.
295 (Can.); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.). The most recent major Cana-
dian Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject is McKinney v. University of Guelph, 76
D.L.R.4th 545 (1990) (Can.). For a discussion of McKinney's import, see infra notes 18-46
and accompanying text.
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of happenstance. It was a deliberate choice which must be
respected. We do not really know why this approach was taken,
but several reasons suggest themselves. Historically, bills of rights,
of which that of the United States is the great constitutional exem-
plar, have been directed at government. Government is the body
that can enact and enforce rules and authoritatively impinge on
individual freedom. Only government [is] require[d] to be... con-
stitutionally shackled to preserve rights of the individual. Others,
it is true, may offend against the rights of individuals. This is espe-
cially true in a world in which economic life is largely left to the
private sector where powerful private institutions are not directly
affected by democratic forces. But government can either regulate
these or create distinct bodies for the protection of human rights
and the advancement of human dignity.
14
Therefore, the Charter does not reach any type of discrimination in
the private sector. As a result, the usefulness of section 15 as an anti-
sex discrimination law is limited to those situations where, using
United States terminology, "state action" exists.
3. Defining the Reach of the Charter
Due to the Charter's relative infancy, Canadian courts are only
beginning the difficult process of determining its reach in the "state
action" context. For example, in Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery,"5 the Canadian Supreme
Court stated, "It would also seem that the Charter would apply to
many forms of delegated legislation, regulations, orders in council,
possibly municipal by-laws, and by-laws and regulations of other crea-
tures of Parliament and the Legislatures."
1 6
The activities of persons appointed by the government to carry
out statutory purposes are clearly within the Charter's ambit.' 7 Thus,
the government cannot evade the Charter's reach by appointing
others to perform governmental acts. However, Canada's search for a
clear articulation of the Charter's reach remains incomplete.
14. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 634. Of course, the United States approach also pre-
cludes constitutional protections of purely private action through its "state action" require-
ment. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.).
16. Id. at 602.
17. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (Can.) (Charter ap-
plies to an order of an arbitrator appointed by the federal Minister of Labour, pursuant to the
Labour Code, R.S.C., L-1 (1970)).
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4. McKinney v. University of Guelph
The Canadian Supreme Court's decision in McKinney v. Univer-
sity of Guelph 18 illustrates its struggle to develop a general articula-
tion of the Charter's application. In McKinney, the Court considered
whether the Charter applied to college and university activities.' 9
Specifically, the Court considered whether section 15 of the Charter
prohibited mandatory retirement requirements set by the educational
institutions.20
The Court recognized that Canadian colleges and universities are
creatures of statute that carry out important public service func-
tions.2' Such institutions rely on and receive significant public fund-
ing. 22 Moreover, statutes determine their basic powers and governing
structures. 23 Despite these significant government controls, the Court
found that the institutions were legally autonomous entities that en-
joyed independence from government:
The legal autonomy of the universities is fully buttressed by their
traditional position in society. Any attempt by government to in-
18. 76 D.L.R.4th 545 (1990) (Can.).
19. Id. at 555.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 641. The Court stated:
From the early days of this country, several of the provinces acted to establish pro-
vincial universities, one of which, of course, was the University of Toronto which was
established by the Ontario legislature in 1859. Its governing statute is now the Uni-
versity of Toronto Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 56. Other universities were created out of
specialized educational bodies under the direct control of the province, such as the
University of Guelph, which was created in its present form in 1964 by the University
of Guelph Act, 1964, S.O. 1964, c. 120. Others were founded by private groups for
religious and linguistic purposes such as Sacred Heart College in Sudbury, which
became Laurentian University with the passage of the Laurentian University of
Sudbury Act, 1960, S.O. 1960, c. 151, as amended by S.O. 1961-62, c. 154, ss. 1-7.
Others, like York University, were originally affiliates of older universities but later
became separate universities: York University Act, 1965, S.O. 1965, c. 143. These
statutes set out the universities' powers, functions, privileges and governing struc-
ture. While these vary from university to university, they are in general much the
same. As well, the University Expropriation Powers Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 516, gives
them expropriation powers, a matter not in issue here. The Degree Granting Act,
1983, S.O. 1983, c. 36, restricts the entities that can operate a university and grant
university degrees.
Id.
22. Public funding of the Canadian educational institutions is significant: "The operating
grants alone range, according to the evidence, between a low for York of 68.8 percent of its
operating funds to a high for Guelph of 78.9 percent." Id. at 641. The Canadian legislature
also provides funds for most capital expenditures and special funding "earmarked to meet
specific policies," and "defines tuition fees within a formula that limits the universities' discre-
tion within a narrow scope." Id.
23. Structural control is, in the main, achieved through the terms of the enabling acts.
See supra note 21 for a listing of the acts.
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fluence university decisions, especially decisions regarding appoint-
ment, tenure and dismissal of academic staff, would be strenuously
resisted by the universities on the basis that this could lead to
breaches of academic freedom. In a word, these are not govern-
ment decisions. Though the legislature may determine much of
the environment in which universities operate, the reality is that
they function as autonomous bodies within that environment.
24
The Court noted that the United States, whose Bill of Rights is
24. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 641. In Harrison v. University of British Columbia, 77
D.L.R.4th 55 (1990) (Can.), the Canadian Supreme Court applied the McKinney rationale to
similar facts. The University of British Columbia had established a mandatory retirement
policy in 1939. The respondents, who retired from university employment at the age of 65
pursuant to the university's policy, challenged its validity, in part, under the Charter. The
Court, applying the precedent established in McKinney, found the Charter inapplicable. The
Court stated:
The relatively minor factual differences in the two cases do not affect the matter. The
fact that in the present case the Lieutenant-Governor appoints a majority of the
members of the university's board of governors or that the Minister of Education
may require the university to submit reports or other forms of information does not
lead to the conclusion that the impugned policies of mandatory retirement constitute
government action. While I would acknowledge that these facts suggest a higher
degree of governmental control than was present in McKinney, I do not think they
suggest the quality of control that would justify the application of the Charter ....
The respondents also sought to establish government control of the university by
means of the Financial Administration Act, the Auditor General Act, and the Compen-
sation Stabilization Act. These Acts, no doubt, apply to the university in that they
monitor and regulate the expenditure of public funds it receives. However, I agree
with the Court of Appeal, that "the fact that the university is fiscally accountable
under these statutes does not establish government control or influence upon the core
functions of the university and, in particular, upon the policy and contracts in issue
in this case."
Harrison, 77 D.L.R.4th at 73 (citations omitted). However, governmental control over the
decision-making of a college can rise to a level sufficient to invoke the application of the Char-
ter. In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass'n v. Douglas College, 77 D.L.R.4th 94 (1990) (Can.),
the Canadian Supreme Court considered the status of colleges created pursuant to the College
and Institute Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 53 (1979). Referring to Douglas College, which was created
under the College and Institute Act, the Court stated:
The affairs of the college are managed and directed by a board of seven members, all
of whom are appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council at pleasure (s. 6).
The Minister, however, exercises direct and substantial control over the college pur-
suant to ss. 2 and 3. Thus the Minister may establish policy or issue directives re-
garding post-secondary education and training, may provide services considered
necessary, approves all by-laws of the Board and provides the necessary funding-in
the 1985/86 calendar year, for example, 83% of its operating funds. The college
submits an annual budget to the Minister. Briefly put, the college is simply a dele-
gate through which the government operates a system of post-secondary education in
the province, as its status as a Crown agency makes immediately evident. It is quite
unlike universities like the University of British Columbia described in Harrison v.
University of British Columbia.... which, though largely dependent on government
funding, manages its own affairs.
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass'n, 77 D.L.R.4th at 106.
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the "great constitutional exemplar, ' ' 25 also refuses to find "state ac-
tion" in similarly regulated entities that receive public funds and
render public services.26 The Court acknowledged the existence of
United States cases holding that significant government funding con-
stitutes state involvement that is sufficient to trigger constitutional
guarantees, but distinguished such cases as being "largely confined to
cases of racial discrimination which was the prime target of the 14th
Amendment. ' 27 The Court stated that "these judicial intrusions, de-
vised to meet a problem particular to the United States, should not be
imported here."'28 Finally, the Court refused to consider United
States cases holding that state universities are state actors,29 on the
ground that "Canadian universities ... are private entities. ' 30
The McKinney majority opinion offers a narrow view of the
Charter's reach. For the Charter to apply, entities other than the fed-
eral, provincial, and territorial legislatures, and the executive and ad-
ministrative branches of these governments, must be organized or
governed such that they are, in effect, part of "the government appa-
ratus" or are "implementing governmental policy."31 While the exist-
ence of sufficient governmental action rests on the facts of each case,
the Canadian Supreme Court apparently requires the facts to show a
25. See supra text accompanying note 14.
26. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 643 (citing Greenya v. George Wash. Univ., 512 F.2d
556 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)) (order of signals is as presented by the Canadian Supreme
Court). For additional supporting authority, the Canadian Supreme Court could have cited
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school, whose income was derived pri-
marily from public sources and which was regulated by public authorities, did not act under
color of state law when it discharged employees).
27. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 643 (citing Greenya, 512 F.2d at 560). It is a general rule
in the United States that public contributions of even great sums of money do not make the
receiving entity a state actor. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 991; Kohn, 457 U.S. at 830.
28. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 643 (citing W.S. Tarnopolsky, The Equality of Rights in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REV. 242, 256 (1983)).
29. Eg., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) ("A state university without
question is a state actor."). The decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Krynicky v.
University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985), is also
notable. In Krynicky, the court applied the "symbiotic relationship test" to find the University
of Pittsburgh and Temple University state actors. See Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 98. The court
found that the state has "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with ...
(the acting party] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."
Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
30. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 643. But see Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass'n, 77
D.L.R.4th at 94.
31. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 643.
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direct and a clearly definable connection between the government and
the entity's action:
There may be situations in respect of specific activities where it can
fairly be said that the decision is that of the government, or that
the government sufficiently partakes in the decision to make it an
act of the government, but there is nothing here to indicate any
participation in the decision by the government and, as noted,
there is no statutory requirement imposing mandatory retirement
on the universities.
32
The Canadian approach clearly incorporates the United States
Supreme Court's "nexus" approach: "[T]he inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly
be treated as that of the State itself."33 Additionally, the Canadian
Supreme Court follows the United States in recognizing that "[o]nly
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious in-
volvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance. ' ' 34
5. Justice Wilson's Dissent in McKinney v. University of Guelph
and the Influence of United States Law
Justice Wilson's dissent in McKinney attacked the majority's
''very narrow test of government action" in which "only those entities
which actually are 'government' will fall within the ambit of the Char-
ter."' 35 Justice Wilson argued that the majority overly relied on
United States tradition, which holds government action suspect and
continually seeks to limit government's reach:
Unhappy with the injustices the Americans perceived were perpe-
trated against them by the British, the American people were left
with a deep distrust of powerful states. The United States Consti-
tution enshrines the belief of the American people that unless the
state is strictly controlled it poses a great danger to individual lib-
erty. Its primary focus, articulated in the bulk of its provisions, is
against "state action." Canada does not share this history.
36
32. Id. For a case in which the Canadian Supreme Court found sufficient governmental
participation in its mandatory retirement decision, see Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass'n, 77
D.L.R.4th at 94.
33. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
34. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
35. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 572 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 573 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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Justice Wilson acknowledged that it was natural in the early
stage of Charter jurisprudence to look to United States constitutional
tradition.37 Yet, she posited that Canada needed independence from
United States influence, and that it needed to develop a distinct legal
perception of its government's proper role. 38 In discussing the histori-
cal development of the Canadian state,39 Justice Wilson noted that,
unlike citizens of the United States, "Canadians recognize that gov-
ernment has traditionally had and continues to have an important
role to play in the creation and preservation of a just Canadian
state."4o
Contending that the majority's approach prevented the govern-
ment from protecting against unjust private action, Justice Wilson of-
fered a more flexible approach to defining the Charter's reach. 4' She
proposed the consideration of three questions in instances in which an
entity is not "self-evidently" part of government. 42 Her approach in-
corporated three tests for considering the existence of governmental
action: the "control test," the "government function test," and the
"statutory authority and the public interest test":
1. Does the legislative, executive or administrative branch of gov-
ernment exercise general control over the entity in question?
2. Does the entity perform a traditional government function or a
function which in more modem times is recognized as a responsi-
bility of the state?
3. Is the entity one that acts pursuant to statutory authority specifi-
cally granted to it to enable it to further an objective that govern-
ment seeks to promote in the broader public interest?
4 3
37. "Naturally, at that early stage of Canadian Charter jurisprudence, the American con-
stitutional tradition was heavily relied upon." Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 574-79 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
40. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 582 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 592 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting). These questions raise issues familiar to United States
jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has employed various approaches in deter-
mining whether state action exists. One such approach is the "nexus" approach. See supra
note 33 and accompanying text. The Court has also employed the "symbiotic relationship"
approach. See supra note 29. Another approach, the "governmental compulsion" test, deter-
mines whether the public entity compelled an act. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 170 (1970). Finally, under the restrictive "public function" test, the Court considers
whether the function is traditionally performed by the government and exclusively reserved to
government. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 345. Justice Wilson's call in McKinney for indepen-
dence from the United States constitutional tradition makes her unable to rely on United
1992]
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Justice Wilson asserted that these questions would constitute
mere "guidelines"" for a reviewing court. Nevertheless, she indicated
that an affirmative answer to any one of the questions would be a
"strong indicator" that the entity is part of government and is there-
fore within the Charter's reach.
4
Justice Wilson, concerned that a restrictive approach would dis-
able the government from protecting its citizens against unjust private
action, argued for a flexible approach to finding governmental action.
Government regulation by statute, however, can prohibit workplace
discrimination in those instances where the Charter does not apply."
III. CANADIAN STATUTES
A. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
The Canadian Human Rights Act ("Act") established federal
anti-workplace discrimination law.47 The Act extends to all matters
"within the legislative authority of Parliament. ' 48 Federal authority
reaches not only federal government entities, but also private, inter-
provincial operations in the areas of communications and transporta-
tion.49 The Act also governs federally-chartered Canadian banks and
States case law to support her broader approach for determining the reach of the Charter. For
example, Krynicky would assist Justice Wilson's position. See supra note 29.
44. McKinney, 76 D.L.R.4th at 593 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
46. Relevant Ontario legislation only prohibited age discrimination against persons be-
tween the ages of 18 and 65. Human Rights Code, S.O., ch. 53, § 9(a). The McKinney appel-
lants were not within the protected class. There was no statute to protect the appellant
employees.
47. R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.).
48. Id. § 2.
49. Interviews with Stewart Beaty, Director of Policy & Communications; Joselyn Bis-
sette-Aubry, General Counsel; and Glenys Parry, Director of Complaints & Procedures, Cana-
dian Human Rights Commission, in Ottawa, Canada (Aug. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Canadian
Human Rights Commission Interviews].
An analysis of the constitutional distribution of legislative authority between the federal
government and the provinces is beyond the scope of this Article. For a detailed discussion of
the distribution of such authority in the labor regulation context, see Bell Canada v. Qu6bec
(Commission de la sant6 et de la s6curiti du travail), 51 D.L.R.4th 161 (1988) (Can.); Cana-
dian Nat'l Ry. v. Courtois, 51 D.L.R.4th 271 (1988) (Can.). Both cases involved attempts by
provinces to regulate the working conditions, labor relations, and management of "federal
undertakings." The Canadian Supreme Court recently considered whether the federal govern-
ment has authority to regulate. See Regina v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.. 49 D.L.R.4th
161, 188 (1988) (Can.) (holding that the federal government has authority to regulate the
dumping of waste in provincial waters under "the natural concern doctrine of the peace, order
and good government power of the Parliament of Canada").
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some mining operations.50 Federal law protects approximately one
million Canadian workers, or approximately ten percent of the Cana-
dian workforce. 51 The various territorial and provincial anti-work-
place discrimination laws protect the remainder of the workforce. 52
Canadian human rights statutes are "of a special nature, not
quite constitutional but certainly more than ordinary." 53 Each case
involving these statutes requires a "fair, liberal interpretation to ad-
vance the objects of the legislation."' 54 As with United States civil
rights law,55 the purpose of Canadian human rights law is to eradicate
discrimination. 56
B. Anti-Sexual Harassment Legislation
Every Canadian jurisdiction prohibits sex discrimination in em-
ployment. 57 Six jurisdictions also specifically prohibit harassment in
the workplace. 58 Additionally, the need for special legislation dealing
with sexual harassment has lessened due to the Canadian Supreme
Court's Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. decision, which defined sex
discrimination to include sexual harassment5 9 The Janzen decision
50. Canadian Human Rights Commission Interviews, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. Canada's 13 basic political jurisdictions can be divided into the following three cate-
gories: (1) the federal government; (2) the territories, specifically the Northwest Territories and
Yukon; and (3) the 10 Canadian provinces, specifically the provinces of Alberta, British Co-
lumbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Is-
land, Quibec, and Saskatchewan. This Article's Appendix provides a citation to each
jurisdiction's human rights law, with a particular citation to and description of the key anti-
workplace sex discrimination provisions.
53. Re Ontario Human Rights Comm'n and Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 23 D.L.R.4th 321, 329
(1985) (Can.); see also Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian Nat'l Ry., 40 D.L.R.4th 193,
207-09 (1988) (Can.).
54. Robichaud v. The Queen, 40 D.L.R.4th 577, 580 (1987) (Can.).
55. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'g Barnes v. Train, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974). In Barnes, the court stated, "[T]he courts
have consistently recognized that Title VII must be construed liberally to achieve its objec-
tives; as we ourselves recently noted, it 'requires an interpretation animated by the broad hu-
manitarian and remedial purposes underlying the federal proscription of employment
discrimination.'" Id. at 994 (footnote omitted) (quoting Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 616
(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
56. See Robichaud, 40 D.L.R.4th at 582.
57. See infra Appendix.
58. See Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6, §§ 14.1-.2 (1985); Newfoundland
Human Rights Code, S. Nfld., ch. 62, §§ 14(l)-(2) (1988); Manitoba Human Rights Code,
C.C.S.M., ch. H-175, §§ 19(l)-(2) (1987); Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O., ch. 53, §§ 6(2)-
(3) (1981); Qu6bec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, § 10(1) (1977);
Yukon Human Rights Act, S.Y.T., ch. 3, §§ 13(l)-(2) (1987).
59. Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989) (Can.).
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plays a role in defining Canadian sexual harassment law that is similar
to the role played by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 60 in defining United States law.
IV. PRE-JANZEN V. PLATY ENTERPRISES LTD. CANADIAN
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The first Canadian case to equate sexual harassment with prohib-
ited sex discrimination was Bell v. Ladas.61 In Bell, the Adjudicator,
Owen B. Shime, considered the scope of sex discrimination under On-
tario's Human Rights Code. In doing so, he wrote the following:
But what about sexual harassment? Clearly a person who is disad-
vantaged because of her sex is being discriminated against in her
employment when employer conduct denies her financial rewards
because of her sex, or exacts some form of sexual compliance to
improve or maintain her existing benefits. The evil to be remedied
is the utilization of economic power or authority so as to restrict a
woman's guaranteed and equal access to the work place, and all of
its benefits, free from extraneous pressures having to do with the
mere fact that she is a woman. Where a woman's equal access is
denied or when terms or conditions differ when compared to male
employees, the woman is discriminated against.
The forms of prohibited conduct that, in my view, are dis-
criminatory run the gamut from overt gender-based activity, such
as coerced intercourse to unsolicited physical contact to persistent
propositions to more subtle conduct such as gender-based insults
and taunting, which may reasonably be perceived to create a nega-
tive psychological and emotional work environment.
6 2
Bell involved two women employees, Cherie Bell and Anna
Korczak, who alleged acts of sexual harassment against Ernest Ladas,
the officer and owner of their corporate employer. 63 The women com-
plained that Ladas propositioned them and made sexually-oriented
insults. 64 Adjudicator Shime dismissed both complaints, finding that
Bell's testimony was unreliable and that Korczak simply failed to
carry her burden of proof.65 Although Bell is significant for Adjudi-
cator Shime's dicta, his proposition was not forcefully applied until
60. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff'g Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'g 23
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (D.D.C. 1980).
61. 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1980).
62. Id. at D/156.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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one year later in Coutroubis v. Sklavos Printing.66
The view first espoused in Bell and given force in Coutroubis is
that sexual harassment constitutes prohibited sex discrimination. 67
Other Canadian tribunals soon accepted that view. 68 In early Cana-
dian cases, the various administrative tribunals and courts recognized
that the Canadian legal theory of sexual harassment owed its first
clear articulation to United States case development. 69 Canadian tri-
ers of fact considered United States cases and often adopted them as
authority for similar holdings. 70 Although at least one early decision
expressed some concern about relying on United States authority, 71
Canadian courts nevertheless used such authority, particularly deci-
sions based on United States statutory law, rather than the United
States Constitution.72
V. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO DEFINING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
A. Early United States Case Development of Sexual Harassment
Theories
The United States lower courts began to define the scope of ille-
gal sexual harassment in the mid-1970s. The early cases primarily
involved an employer's retaliatory actions against an employee be-
66. 2 C.H.R.R. D/457 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1981).
67. See Bell, 1 C.H.R.R. at D/155; Coutroubis, 2 C.H.R.R. at D/457.
68. See, e.g., Kotyk v. Canadian Employment & Immigration Comm'n, 4 C.H.R.R. D/
1416 (Can. H.R. Comm'n 1983); Deisting v. Dollar Pizza Ltd., 3 C.H.R.R. D/898 (Alta. H.R.
Comm'n 1982); Doherty v. Lodger's Int'l Ltd., 38 N.B.R.2d 217 (N.B. Bd. Inq. 1981); Torres
v. Royalty Kitchenware Ltd., 3 C.H.R.R. D/858 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1982); Mitchell v. Traveller
Inn Ltd., 2 C.H.R.R. D/590 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1981); Cox v. Jagbritte Inc., 3 C.H.R.R. D/609
(Ont. Bd. Inq. 1981); Hughes v. Dollar Snack Bar, 3 C.H.R.R. D/1014 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1981);
Phillips v. Hermiz, 5 C.H.R.R. D/2450 (Sask. H.R. Comm'n 1984). For appellate court au-
thority equating sexual harassment with illegal sex discrimination, see Re Mehta and MacKin-
non, 19 D.L.R.4th 148 (1985) (N.S.); Foisy v. Bell Canada, 18 D.L.R.4th 222 (1984) (Que.).
69. See, e.g., Watt v. Regional Municipality of Niagara, 5 C.H.R.R. D/2453 (Ont. Bd.
Inq. 1984).
70. See generally ARJUN P. AGGARIVAL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 12
(1987).
71. See Doherty, 38 N.B.R.2d at 235. The court feared that decisions using United States
authority would be based on the United States Constitution, rather than on the Charter. See
id.
72. See, e.g., id. The courts generally relied on title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(17) (1988)). See, e.g., id. Re
Mehta and MacKinnon exemplifies the typical decisional approach: "A review of the decisions,
including the American authorities, leads me to the conclusion that sexual harassment as a
term or condition of employment is prohibited by s. 1 IA(l) of the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Act." Re Mehta and MacKinnon, 19 D.L.R.4th at 158.
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cause of the employee's refusal to respond to sexual demands. Such
retaliation is quid pro quo sexual harassment.
The plaintiff employees were initially unsuccessful in equating
acts of sexual harassment with sex discrimination under title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").73 In the first reported case
of sexual harassment, Corne v. Bausch & Lomb,74 an Arizona district
court found that the conduct at issue was simply a matter of the "per-
sonal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" of the supervisor.7 5 Ac-
cording to the court, Title VII did not make sexually-oriented
conduct illegal when it had "no relationship to the nature of the em-
ployment. ' 76 In other early cases, courts agreed that Title VII did
not apply, viewing the conduct not as discrimination based on sex, but
as discrimination based on an individual characteristic of sexual at-
tractiveness or on a refusal to engage in sexual conduct.
77
1. Quid Pro Quo Theory
The quid pro quo theory was first recognized as a viable Title VII
theory of recovery in Williams v. Saxbe.7 In Williams, a federal gov-
ernment worker alleged that she had a good working relationship
with her supervisor until she refused his sexual advances. 79 Thereaf-
ter, the employee faced a pattern of retaliatory action. 0 The district
court held that the supervisor's retaliatory actions amounted to illegal
sex discrimination under Title VII.1 After Williams, several appel-
late courts reversed decisions unsympathetic to the quid pro quo the-
73. Title VII forbids workplace discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1) (1988) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect
to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
74. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). Although
reported after Come, the first federal district court sexual harassment case was Barnes v.
Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
75. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
76. Id.
77. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Amer., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 123.
78. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell,
587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 655.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 661.
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ory.8 2 By the end of the decade, the quid pro quo theory was firmly
established within the lower courts and incorporated into Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines.
83
2. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
In addition to quid pro quo sexual harassment, United States
courts recognize hostile environment sexual harassment. Unlike the
quid pro quo theory, the hostile environment theory does not focus on
the effect of sexual harassment on job benefits. Instead, it focuses on
the working conditions that an employee is forced to endure. Hostile
environment sexual harassment exists when conduct of a sexual na-
ture, unwelcome to an employee, is sufficiently severe or pervasive "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.1
8 4
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Bundy v.
Jackson,85 was the first circuit to recognize the hostile environment
theory. In Bundy, an employee alleged that her supervisors forced
her to endure a pattern of harassment, including repeated requests for
sex and listening to details regarding the employee's sexual proclivi-
ties.8 6 While the employee experienced no loss of job benefits, the su-
pervisor's conduct was "standard operating procedure" in the
plaintiff's workplace.8 7 Overturning the district court's denial of re-
lief, the appellate court found that Title VII sex discrimination could
exist "where an employer created or condoned a substantially dis-
criminatory work environment regardless of whether the complaining
82. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Amer., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'g 418 F. Supp.
233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977),
rev'g 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977),
vacating 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1985); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
rev'g Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
83. On November 10, 1980, the EEOC issued Final Guidelines on Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace ("Guidelines"), identifying sexual harassment as a form of illegal sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. See 45 Fed. Reg. 74676-7 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)-
(f) (1990)). The EEOC Guidelines adopt both the quid pro quo and hostile environment theo-
ries of recovery for sexual harassment. See id. The Canadian courts have quoted the EEOC
Guidelines with approval. See, e.g., Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989)
(Can.). For a discussion of hostile environment sexual harassment, see infra notes 84-90 and
accompanying text.
84. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)), aff'g Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rev'g 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
85. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 940.
87. Id.
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employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimina-
tion."8 8 The court stated that liability was necessary; otherwise, an
employer could harass a worker "with impunity by carefully stopping
short of firing the employee or taking any other tangible action
against her in response to the resistance, thereby creating the impres-
sion ... that the employer did not take the ritual of harassment and
resistance 'seriously.' "89 Other courts soon accepted the Bundy
reasoning.90
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson
A decade of developing workplace sexual harassment theories of
recovery under Title VII culminated in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 91
1. Factual Background
In 1974, plaintiff Mechelle Vinson began working for Meritor
Savings Bank. 92 She started as a teller-trainee and was eventually
promoted to assistant bank manager.93 At trial, it was undisputed
that plaintiff's employer based her promotions solely on merit.94 Af-
ter Meritor Savings Bank terminated plaintiff in 1978 for excessive use
of sick leave, she sued both the bank and her supervisor, Sidney Tay-
lor, for illegal sex discrimination under Title VII. 95
Plaintiff testified that her supervisor made repeated sexual de-
mands of her in the workplace. 96 His sexual contact with plaintiff
included frequent acts of sexual intercourse, public fondling, and, on
several occasions, rape.97 Plaintiff's employer and supervisor denied
the allegations.9" Her employer further argued that, if any sexual har-
assment occurred, the bank was unaware of it and did not approve
88. Id. at 943-44.
89. Id. at 945.
90. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
91. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff'g Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'g 23
Fair Empl. Prac Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. at 59-60.,
94. Id. at 60.
95. Id.
96. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
97. id.
98. Id. at 61.
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The district court denied plaintiff relief without resolving con-
flicting testimony between plaintiff and her employer.'00 The court
stated that, even if plaintiff and her supervisor had engaged in sexual
relations, "that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do
with her continued employment ... or her advancement or promo-
tions .... ,,o The court concluded that, absent sexual harassment
affecting economic benefits, plaintiff was not a victim of Title VII sex
discrimination. 102 The court noted both the employer's policy against
employment discrimination and the fact that plaintiff had not filed a
complaint against her supervisor.10 3 Under those circumstances, the
court held that plaintiff's employer, absent notice, was not liable for
her supervisor's alleged actions. 1°4
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, indi-
cating that a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment could be
based on either a quid pro quo or hostile environment theory of recov-
ery.105 It found that plaintiff's allegations met the definition of illegal
hostile environment sexual harassment.l°6
The court held that any voluntariness in the alleged sexual rela-
tionship between plaintiff and her supervisor was immaterial because
the facts indicated that the supervisor's actions made plaintiff's toler-
ation of harassment "a condition of her employment."'' 0 7 The court
concluded that any evidence concerning plaintiff's personal fantasies
and mode of dress that might have contributed to the trial court's
finding of voluntariness was immaterial.108
The court also determined that employers should be held to a
strict liability standard for sexual harassment by a supervisor.1 ° 9 It
99. Id.
100. See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
101. Id. at 42.
102. See id. at 43.
103. Id. at 41-42.
104. Id. at 42.
105. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nor. Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id. at 146.
108. Id. at 146 n.36.
109. Id. at 47.
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broadly defined the concept of supervisor to include an individual
having "the mere existence-or even the appearance of-a significant
degree of influence in vital job decisions." 10
3. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court confirmed in Vinson that Title
VII liability attached to instances of sexual harassment. It stated
that, "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discrim-
inate[s]' on the basis of sex" under Title VII."'1 The Court expressly
found that both hostile environment sexual harassment and quid pro
quo sexual harassment were actionable under Title VII, stating that
"a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that dis-
crimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment."1
2
As to the scope of actionable hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the Court stated that "not all workplace conduct that may be
described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of
employment within the meaning of Title VII.' ' 13 Actionable conduct
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment." 1 4 In Vinson, the plaintiff's allegations were "not only perva-
sive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious
nature.""' 5 Therefore, since the alleged conduct in Vinson was
"plainly sufficient to state a claim of 'hostile environment' sexual har-
assment,"" 6 the Court did not provide a detailed analysis of its ap-
proach for determining sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct.
The Court found that voluntariness was not a Title VII defense,
and that the district court erred in focusing on plaintiff's alleged vol-
untary participation in sexual activities with her supervisor.1 7 The
Court explained that the "correct inquiry" was whether plaintiff "by
110. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 150. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has defined a supervi-
sor as one who has been "delegated the power to make employment decisions." Horn v. Duke
Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985).
111. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64.
112. Id. at 66.
113. Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
114. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
115. Id.
116. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
117. Id. at 68.
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her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel-
come, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was
voluntary."" 8
The Court also disagreed with the appellate court's exclusion of
evidence regarding plaintiff's mode of dress and personal fantasies.
The Court stated that, "[w]hile 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent
is not a defense . . . , it does not follow that a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in deter-
mining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwel-
come."" 9 However, the Court further stated that trial judges should
consider the potential for unfair prejudice to plaintiffs in admitting
such evidence.1
20
As to the critical issue of the standard of employer liability for
sexual harassment, the Court considered three possibilities. The first,
argued by plaintiff, was the strict liability standard advanced by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.' 2t The second, urged
by her employer, was that an employee's failure to provide an em-
ployer with notice, through the employee's failure to use the em-
ployer's grievance procedure, constituted an absolute defense to any
employer liability. 22 The third, posited by the EEOC as amicus cu-
riae, was a two-level standard of employer liability. The EEOC as-
serted that strict liability should apply to the employer in a quid pro
quo case. It urged the following standard in a hostile environment
case:
If the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment
and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve
sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advan-
tage of that procedure, the employer should be shielded from liabil-
118. Id. As the harasser's conduct must be unwelcome, evidence of the plaintiff's disap-
proval of the conduct is relevant. The plaintiff's express disapproval of the conduct is particu-
larly important from an evidentiary perspective in cases where the plaintiff may have initially
condoned sexually-oriented conduct, but later found the continued conduct offensive and un-
welcome. See EEOC Decision 84-1, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1887, 1890 (1983). Ini-
tially condoning the conduct does not result in a waiver of legal protections. See Swentik v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987). The Swentik court found that "plaintiff's use of
foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections
against unwelcome harassment.'" Id. at 557 (citing Katz, 709 F.2d at 254). The Swentik
court also stated that "[t]he trial judge must determine whether plaintiff welcomed the particu-
lar conduct in question from the alleged harasser." Id.
119. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ity absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environment
(obtained, e.g., by the filing of a charge with the EEOC or a com-
parable state agency). In all other cases, the employer will be liable
if it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, considering all
the facts of the case, the victim in question had no reasonably
available avenue for making his or her complaint known to appro-
priate management officials.
123
The Court noted that the issue of liability had "a rather abstract
quality about it given the state of the record" in this case. 124 As
noted, the trial court had not resolved the conflicting testimony be-
tween plaintiff and her supervisor.125 The Court reminded the parties:
We do not know at this stage whether Taylor made any sexual
advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether those ad-
vances were unwelcome, whether they were sufficiently pervasive
to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they were "so
pervasive and so long continuing.., that the employer must have
become conscious of [them]."'
126
The Court, therefore, declined "the parties' invitation to issue a defin-
itive rule on employer liability."' 27 However, the Court provided
some limited guidance on the subject by refusing to accept the appel-
late court's notion that employers are "always automatically liable for
sexual harassment by their supervisors."1 28 The Court indicated that
Congress intended to place limits on an employer's liability under Ti-
tle VII, and that it directed the lower courts to "look to agency princi-
ples" for guidance. 129 However, the Court also found that an
employer's lack of notice "does not necessarily insulate that employer
123. Id. at 71. The EEOC departed from its Guidelines in its argument to the Supreme
Court. Under the EEOC Guidelines, employers are strictly liable for the acts of agents and
supervisors "regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(c) (1990). The EEOC Guidelines do not
distinguish between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment with regard to
employer liability for supervisory acts.
124. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
125. Id. at 61.
126. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1183, 1197-99 (8th Cir. 1981)) (alteration in
original).
127. Id.
128. Id. The majority opinion subscribed to this position. Justice Marshall, in a concur-
ring opinion, accepted a strict liability standard for supervisory misdeeds in both the quid pro
quo and hostile environment cases. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring). See infra note 191
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court's approval of Justice
Marshall's approach.
129. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
256
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
from liability."130 The Court rejected the employer's argument that it
was insulated from liability because of its grievance procedure and
anti-discrimination policy. 3 1 Although plaintiff's failure to use the
employer's grievance procedure was relevant, it was not "necessarily
dispositive."1
32
The Court criticized the employer's anti-discrimination policy
for failing to expressly address the sexual harassment concept in that
it "did not alert employees to their employer's interest in correcting
that form of discrimination."' 133 The Court also criticized the em-
ployer's procedure for filing and processing grievances.134 The proce-
dure required the employee to initially file the grievance with the
employee's supervisor. 135 Because, in Vinson, the supervisor was the
alleged harasser, the Court stated that "it is not altogether surprising"
that the plaintiff failed to follow the procedure. 136
VI. THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN JANZEN V.
PLA TY ENTERPRISES LTD.
The line of Canadian cases accepting the United States-influ-
enced Bell v. Ladas 137 approach to defining sexual harassment as sex
discrimination continued unbroken until the Manitoba Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Re Janzen and Platy Enterprises Ltd.138 This initial
departure led to the Canadian Supreme Court's landmark Janzen de-
cision, which has been central to the development of Canadian law.
A. Factual Background
Dianna Janzen and Tracy Govereau worked as waitresses at the
Pharos Restaurant in Winnipeg, Manitoba.139 They alleged a series of
acts of sexual harassment, including overt sexual advances and touch-
ing, by the restaurant cook, Tommy Grammas. 140 Platy Enterprises
Ltd. was the owner and employer-corporation of the restaurant. 14 1
130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 72-73.
134. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 73.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1980).
138. 33 D.L.R.4th 32 (Man. Ct. App. 1987).
139. Janzen v. Platy Enters. Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 355 (1989) (Can.).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The president and manager of the employer-corporation was
Eleftheros Anastasiadis.142 The cook did not hold an ownership inter-
est in the restaurant, nor did he serve as an officer of the employer-
corporation. 143 Although he did not possess any actual disciplinary
authority over plaintiffs, the cook held himself out as having authority
over their continued employment, and the manager supported his
position. 1"4
Plaintiffs reported the cook's conduct to the manager, who was,
at best, unsympathetic. 145 He treated the matter lightly and insinu-
ated that Janzen had provoked the cook's conduct toward her.146 The
manager did nothing to stop it, and Janzen thereafter quit. 147 As to
Govereau, the manager asked her why she allowed the cook to treat
her in the manner that he did. 148 After a meeting between Govereau
and the manager, the cook's sexually-oriented conduct stopped, but
was replaced with open hostility and criticism by both the cook and
the manager. 49 Eventually, the manager terminated Govereau, os-
tensibly because of a customer's complaint.150
Plaintiffs filed their complaints with the Manitoba Human
Rights Commission, alleging sex discrimination in violation of section
6 of the Manitoba Human Rights Act. 15' Adjudicator Henteleff
heard their complaints jointly. 152 He found that both individuals
were the victims of sexual harassment and that such harassment
amounted to illegal sex discrimination. 5 3 He concluded that both the
employer-corporation and the cook were liable:
The clear intent of Sec. 6(1) [of the Manitoba Human Rights Act],
in respect of areas of discrimination arising therefrom, is not only
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 355.
145. Id. at 355-56.
146. Id. at 356.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 356.
150. Id.
151. S.M., ch. 65, § 6(1) (1974). In 1987, after the plaintiffs in Janzen filed their com-
plaints, the Manitoba Legislature repealed the Human Rights Act and replaced it with the
Human Rights Code, R.S.M., ch. 45 (1987) (codified at C.C.S.M., ch. H-175 (1987)). Section
19 of the new Human Rights Code expressly prohibits sexual harassment. See C.C.S.M., ch.
H-175, § 19 (1987).
152. The decision of Adjudicator Henteleff is reported at 6 C.H.R.R. D/2735 (Man. Bd.
Adjud. 1985).
153. 6 C.H.R.R. D/2735 (Man. Bd. Adjud. 1985).
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to make the employer liable for any acts of sexual harassment di-
rectly committed by such employer, but also makes him responsi-
ble for any such acts committed by a person in authority during
the course of his employment.'
54
Adjudicator Henteleff also stated:
After consideration of all of the evidence, it is my conclusion that
[the cook] was a person in such authority that his acts became
those of the employer, Platy. The complainant Janzen was made
aware of this to the extent that [the cook] was in such a preferred
position, that if she subjected herself to sexual harassment, she was
to blame for it. Accordingly such harassment had become a condi-
tion of her continued employment since [the manager] either
couldn't or wouldn't do anything about it. 
55
The employer-corporation appealed to the Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench, which in all major respects upheld the decision of
Adjudicator Henteleff. 156 Thereafter, the Manitoba Court of Appeal
broke the line of Canadian authority equating sexual harassment with
sex discrimination.1
5 7
B. The Manitoba Court of Appeal Decision
Justices Huband and Twaddle rendered comprehensive separate
opinions in the appellate court decision. Justice Huband expressed
his utter amazement at the development of the law, which equated
sexual harassment with sex discrimination. 58 He considered the two
as separate concepts and used the following example in his argument:
"When a schoolboy steals a kiss from a female classmate, one might
well say that he is harassing her; vexing her; harrying her-but he
surely is not discriminating against her."' 5 9 Considering section 6(1)
of the Manitoba Human Rights Act, he concluded that the section
was aimed at discrimination in a generic sense. 6° He argued that sex
discrimination required the discrimination to be against women as a
group.' 6' Therefore, sexual harassment could not be sex discrimina-
154. Id. at D/2753.
155. Id. at D/2768.
156. See Re Janzen and Platy Enters. Ltd., 24 D.L.R.4th 31 (Man. Ct. Q.B. 1986).
157. See Re Janzen and Platy Enters. Ltd., 33 D.L.R.4th at 32.
158. "I am amazed to think that sexual harassment has been equated with discrimination
on the basis of sex." Id. at 35-36.
159. Id. at 41.
160. Id. at 45.
161. See id. at 43.
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tion, as all women are not the victims of sexual harassment. 162 In
developing this rationale, he adopted the position originally taken by
the early United States sexual harassment cases.1 63
Justice Twaddle also asserted that sexual harassment was not il-
legal sex discrimination.164 He argued that the Manitoba Legislature
intended, through its anti-workplace discrimination legislation, to
prohibit differentiation based on categorical groupings such as sex,
not to prevent differentiation on the basis of individual characteristics
or qualifications.1 65 He explained:
Harassment is as different from discrimination as assault is from
random selection. The victim of assault may be chosen at random
just as the victim of harassment may be chosen because of categori-
cal distinction, but it is nonsense to say that assault is random se-
lection just as it is nonsense to say that harassment is
discrimination. The introduction of a sexual element, be it the na-
ture of the conduct or the gender of the victim, does not alter the
basic fact that harassment and assault are acts, whilst discrimina-
tion and random selection are the methods of choice.
The fact that harassment is sexual in form does not determine
the reason why the victim was chosen. Only if the woman was
chosen on a categorical basis, without regard to individual charac-
teristics, can the harassment be a manifestation of
discrimination. 166
Justice Twaddle further determined that sexual harassment based
upon the particular sexual appeal of a woman could not constitute
illegal sex discrimination: "Where the conduct of an employer is di-
rected at some but not all persons of one category, it must not be
assumed that membership of the category is the reason for the distinc-
tion having been made."' 167
The Manitoba Court of Appeal's decision in Re Janzen and Platy
Enterprises Ltd. generated unfavorable scholarly comment.168 The
162. Re Janzen and Platy Enters Ltd., 33 D.L.R.4th at 43.
163. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
164. Re Janzen and Platy Enters. Ltd., 33 D.L.R.4th at 66.
165. Id. at 63-64.
166. Id. at 66.
167. Id. at 67.
168. See, e.g., Ivan F. Ivankovich, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace-Two Steps Back-
ward: Janzen & Govereau v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 26 ALTA. L. REV. 359 (1988); Mariann
Burka, Sexual Harassment: Manitoba's Step Backward, A Case Comment on Govereau and
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 16 MAN. L.J. 245 (1987). Other jurisdictions subsequently
failed to accept the Manitoba rationale. See, e.g., Herman v. Rodin, 56 D.L.R.4th 180 (Sask.
Ct. Q.B. 1989). Additionally, the Manitoba Legislature repealed the Human Rights Act and
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Canadian Supreme Court reviewed the case and corrected the Mani-
toba Court of Appeal's deviation from the course taken by other Ca-
nadian courts.
C. The Canadian Supreme Court Decision
On May 4, 1989, the Canadian Supreme Court rendered its
unanimous decision in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. 169 There were
two major issues raised in the decision: (1) whether sexual harassment
is sex discrimination, and, if so, (2) whether the employer may be held
liable. 170
1. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination
The Canadian Supreme Court made it clear that, with the excep-
tion of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, all of the Canadian courts pre-
viously considering the issue had equated sexual harassment with sex
discrimination.' 7' The Court looked at United States case law and
found the same equation.' 72 The Court stated that "[t]he Manitoba
Court of Appeal departed radically from this apparently unbroken
line of judicial opinion."' 73 It then considered whether the Manitoba
Court of Appeal's deviation was acceptable.' 74
In discussing this issue, the Court examined the meaning of the
terms "sex discrimination" and "sexual harassment" in the workplace
context.1 75 The Court defined sex discrimination as "practices or atti-
tudes which have the effect of limiting the conditions of employment
of, or the employment opportunities available to, employees on the
basis of a characteristic related to gender."' 76 In defining sexual har-
assment, the Court noted that common descriptions of sexual harass-
ment include "the concept of using a position of power to import
sexual requirements into the workplace thereby negatively altering
replaced it with the Manitoba Human Rights Code, which expressly prohibits sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. See supra note 151.
169. 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989) (Can.). Dickson, C.J.C., wrote the opinion of the Canadian
Supreme Court, joined by Beetz, McIntyre, Wilson, La Forest, and L'Heureux-Dub6, JJ.
170. See id. at 369-82.
171. Id. at 369.
172. Id. at 371 ("Since the middle of the 1970's, courts in the United States, including the
United States Supreme Court .... have also reached the conclusion that forms of sexual har-
assment constitute sex discrimination.").
173. Id.
174. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 371-79.
175. See id. at 371-81.
176. Id. at 372.
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the working conditions of employees who are forced to contend with
sexual demands."' 77 The Court also reviewed legislative definitions of
sexual harassment and concluded:
Emerging from these various legislative proscriptions is the notion
that sexual harassment may take a variety of forms. Sexual harass-
ment is not limited to demands for sexual favours made under
threats of adverse job consequences should the employee refuse to
comply with the demands. Victims of harassment need not
demonstrate that they were not hired, were denied a promotion or
were dismissed from their employment as a result of their refusal
to participate in sexual activity. This form of harassment, in which
the victim suffers concrete economic loss for failing to submit to
sexual demands, is simply one manifestation of sexual harassment,
albeit a particularly blatant and ugly one. Sexual harassment also
encompasses situations in which sexual demands are foisted upon
unwilling employees or in which employees must endure sexual
groping, propositions, and inappropriate comments, but where no
tangible economic rewards are attached to involvement in the
behaviour.17
8
The Court acknowledged the United States' practice of formally
categorizing sexual harassment as either quid pro quo or hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. 79 Although Canadian courts had fre-
quently followed the United States courts' approach to sexual
harassment law, 80 the Canadian Supreme Court found the United
States quid pro quo/hostile work environment dichotomy unhelpful:
While the distinction may have been important to illustrate force-
fully the range of behaviour that constitutes harassment at a time
before sexual harassment was widely viewed as actionable, ...
there is no longer any need to characterize harassment as one of
these forms. The main point in allegations of sexual harassment is
that unwelcome sexual conduct has invaded the workplace, irre-
spective of whether the consequences of the harassment included a
denial of concrete employment rewards for refusing to participate
in sexual activity.1
8 1
The Court did not attempt to exhaustively define sexual harassment;
rather, it broadly defined the term "as unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to
177. Id. at 373.
178. Id. at 374.
179. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
180. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
181. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 375.
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adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the
harassment."18
2
The Court then considered the Manitoba Court of Appeal's ra-
tionale. As previously noted, the Manitoba court linked sexual har-
assment to the harasser's sexual attraction to the victim.183 In other
words, the sexual harassment flowed from the personal characteris-
tics, rather than the gender, of the victim. Since the Manitoba court
interpreted the purpose of the Manitoba Human Rights Act to eradi-
cate generic or categorical discrimination, the Act did not apply to
prohibit sexual harassment aimed at individuals. The Canadian
Supreme Court strongly rejected the Manitoba Court of Appeal's
argument:
To argue that the sole factor underlying the discriminatory action
was the sexual attractiveness of the appellants and to say that their
gender was irrelevant strains credulity. Sexual attractiveness can-
not be separated from gender. The similar gender of both appel-
lants is not a mere coincidence, it is fundamental to understanding
what they experienced. All female employees were potentially sub-
ject to sexual harassment by the respondent Grammas. That his
discriminatory behaviour was pinpointed against two of the female
employees would have been small comfort to other women con-
templating entering such a workplace. Any female considering
employment at the Pharos Restaurant was a potential victim of
Grammas and as such was disadvantaged because of her sex. A
potential female employee would recognize that if she were a male
employee she would not have to run the same risks of sexual har-
assment .... It is one of the purposes of anti-discrimination legis-
lation to remove such denials of equality of opportunity.18 4
The Court, finding that sexual harassment amounted to actionable sex
discrimination, completed its analysis of the issue by quoting the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals: "[D]iscrimination is sex
discrimination whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial
factor in the discrimination."18 5
2. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
The Canadian Supreme Court focused less on the issue of em-
ployer liability than on the issue of whether sexual harassment consti-
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
184. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 380.
185. Id. at 381 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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tutes sex discrimination, as it had previously considered the liability
of employers in the 1987 case of Robichaud v. The Queen. 8 6 In
Robichaud, the Court examined the liability of employers under the
Canadian Human Rights Act.8 7 The decision, handed down after
the Manitoba Court of Appeal's decision in Re Janzen and Platy En-
terprises Ltd., announced that the law held employers liable for work-
related acts. 8 The Court based the liability of employers upon the
statute and not upon the doctrine of vicarious liability:
Hence, I would conclude that the statute contemplates the imposi-
tion of liability on employers for all acts of their employees "in the
course of employment," interpreted in the purposive fashion out-
lined earlier as being in some way related or associated with the
employment. It is unnecessary to attach any label to this type of
liability; it is purely statutory. However, it serves a purpose some-
what similar to that of vicarious liability in tort, by placing respon-
sibility for an organization on those who control it and are in a
position to take effective remedial action to remove undesirable
conditions. 
89
The Robichaud Court believed its approach was "sensible."' 190 It ar-
gued that "the remedial objectives of the [Canadian Human Rights]
Act [would] be stultified if a narrower scheme of liability were fash-
ioned."' 19 The Court quoted at length from Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall's concurring opinion in the United States Supreme Court's
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson decision:
An employer can act only through individual supervisors and em-
ployees; discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal
vote of a corporation's board of directors. Although an employer
may sometimes adopt company-wide discriminatory policies viola-
tive of Title VII, acts that may constitute Title VII violations are
generally effected through the actions of individuals, and often an
individual may take such a step even in defiance of company pol-
icy. Nevertheless, Title VII remedies, such as reinstatement and
backpay, generally run against the employer as an entity.
A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the
power to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or with the power to
186. 40 D.L.R.4th 577 (1987) (Can.).
187. See id. at 580-86.
188. Id. at 584.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 582.
191. Robichaud, 40 D.L.R.4th at 584.
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recommend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the
day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring
a safe, productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the
latter authority should have different consequences than abuse of
the former. In both cases it is the authority vested in the supervi-
sor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong; it is
precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with
the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sex-
ual conduct on subordinates.
9 2
Although the Manitoba statute used the language "in respect of
... occupation or employment,"' 193 the Janzen Court saw no signifi-
cant difference from the Robichaud-considered Canadian Human
Rights Act language of "course of employment."'' 94 The Janzen
Court found that the statutory liability was the same. 95 Because the
cook's conduct in Janzen was clearly work-related, employer liability
attached. 96
VII. COMPARING THE APPROACHES OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
A. Key Aspects of the Janzen-Vinson Relationship
The decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. '97 and Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson 198 were the culmination of approximately
a decade of case evolution. The United States development began ear-
lier and served as the natural model for the Canadian development.
192. Id. at 584-85 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 75-77 (Marshall, J., concurring)) (altera-
tion in original).
193. S.M., ch. 65, § 6(1) (1974).
194. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 382.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Court stated:
In light of this interpretation it cannot be argued that Grammas was not acting in
respect of his employment when he sexually harassed the appellants. His actions
were clearly work-related. Grammas' opportunity to harass the appellants sexually
was directly related to his employment position as the next in line in authority to the
employer. Grammas used his position of authority, a position accorded him by the
respondent, to take advantage of the appellants. The authority granted to Grammas,
both through his control in running the restaurant, including his control over food
orders and work hours, and through his purported ability to fire waitresses, gave him
power over the waitresses. It was the respondent's responsibility to ensure that this
power was not abused. This it clearly did not do, even after the appellants made
specific complaints about the harassment. So it is liable for the actions of Grammas.
Id.
197. 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989) (Can.).
198. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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The two cases reached the high courts in different manners. The
United States Supreme Court accepted a case in which the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had strongly advanced the propo-
sition that sexual harassment amounted to sex discrimination.1 99 The
United States Supreme Court needed only to affirm that "[w]ithout
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because
of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis
of sex" under Title VII.200 The Canadian Supreme Court, however,
was forced to confute the Manitoba Court of Appeal's rationale in
announcing its decision.
1. The Quid Pro Quo/Hostile Environment Dichotomy
Both Supreme Courts equated sexual harassment with illegal sex
discrimination; yet the cases differed in some respects. For example,
the Canadian Supreme Court refused to accept the United States'
quid pro quo/hostile environment distinction, finding such dichotomy
unhelpful.2
01
In terms of developing a definition of sexual harassment, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court's decision to reject the quid pro quo/hostile
environment distinction makes sense. The distinction reflects differ-
ent factual situations that developed separately in United States case
law as action theories. By the time the Canadian Supreme Court de-
cided Janzen, both theories were well entrenched in United States
case law. Except for the radical position taken by the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, Canadian courts accepted both United States theo-
ries as actionable sexual harassment. The Canadian Supreme Court's
position, in effect, affirmed that hostile environment sexual harass-
ment had come of legal age, thus broadening the definition of illegal
sexual harassment.
2. Conduct Amounting to Actionable Sexual Harassment
The Vinson Court stated that not all conduct that might consti-
tute harassment is actionable. 202 Actionable sexual harassment "must
be sufficiently severe or 'pervasive to alter the conditions of [the vic-
199. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
200. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted).
201. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
202. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
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tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' "203
The Canadian Supreme Court in Janzen did not indicate a need for
severity or pervasiveness. In fact, its definition of actionable sexual
harassment was quite general: "Sexual harassment in the workplace
may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that
detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-
related consequences for the victims of the harassment." 204 Conduct
sufficient "to create an abusive working environment," as Vinson re-
quires, represents a greater liability threshold than conduct which
"detrimentally" affects the work environment. 205
The true position of the Courts on this issue is unclear. The
United States Supreme Court had no need to discuss the matter at
length in Vinson, as the conduct in that case was "plainly sufficient to
state a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment. ' '206 Post-
Vinson United States cases have generally adhered to the requirement
of severity or pervasiveness. 20 7 In contrast, the Canadian Supreme
Court in Janzen was quite general in its approach. Canadian lower
courts are currently wrestling with the matter of the post-Janzen lia-
bility threshold.
In 1990, the Newfoundland Ad Hoc Human Rights Commission
("Commission") in Aavik v. Ashbourne 20 8 reviewed lower court Cana-
dian case authority to determine the liability threshold. The Commis-
sion cited Daigle v. Hunter2°9 for its quote of Vinson's "sufficiently
severe or pervasive" language.210 It also cited Daigle for its inclusion
of the following quote from Aragona v. Elegant Lamp Co.:211
[S]exual references which are crude or in bad taste are not neces-
sarily sufficient to constitute a contravention of section 4 of the
203. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis
added).
204. Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 375 (emphasis added).
205. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
206. Id. at 67.
207. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991); Holland v. Jeffer-
son Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307 (7th Cir. 1989); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir.
1989); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Raley v. Board of St. Mary's County Comm'rs, 752 F.
Supp. 1272 (D. Md. 1990); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
208. 12 C.H.R.R. D/401 (Nfld. Ad Hoc H.R. Comm'n 1990).
209. 10 C.H.R.R. D/5670 (N.B. Bd. Inq. 1988).
210. Aavik, 12 C.H.R.R. at D/408 (citing Daigle, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/5674; quoting Vinson,
477 U.S. at 67).
211. 3 C.H.R.R. D/1109 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1982).
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[Ontario Human Rights] Code on the basis of sex. The line of sex-
ual harassment is crossed only where the conduct may be reason-
ably construed to create, as a condition of employment, a work
environment which demands an unwarranted intrusion upon the
employee's sexual dignity as a man or a woman. The line will sel-
dom be easy to draw.2
12
The Commission's post-Janzen decision advanced the proposition
that there is a severity element in Canadian law, which requires that
conduct reach a sufficient level. The Commission quoted Torres v.
Royalty Kitchenware Ltd.213 in support of its position:
[T]here are some employers (and employees) who simply are very
crude and who speak in bad taste in discussing in the work place
their relationships with the opposite sex, or in telling "sex jokes."
It is not the intent or effect of the Human Rights Code, or the
function of a Board of Inquiry to pass judgment on such
persons.
2 14
The Commission held that there is "some line where such bad taste
will constitute sexual harassment. ' 215 The Commission also proposed
that liability has a pervasiveness element, stating that "the word 'har-
ass' itself implies repetition with some degree of frequency. ' 216 Un-
doubtedly, the broad Canadian Supreme Court definition in Janzen
requires further refinement.
3. The Standard for Employer Liability
While the Janzen Court provided little to delineate the bounda-
ries of actionable sexual harassment, it did address the scope of liabil-
ity. The Vinson Court, on the other hand, declined to articulate a
definitive rule on employer liability. Instead, it provided merely a
modicum of guidance. 2
17
After Janzen, it is clear that an employer will be liable for unau-
thorized discriminatory acts of employees if the discriminatory con-
duct is work-related. 218 The only certain principle evident in Vinson
is that the extremes do not apply. An employer's lack of notice "does
212. Aavik, 12 C.H.R.R. at D/408 (citing Daigle, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/5674; quoting
Aragona, 3 C.H.R.R. at D/Il10).
213. 3 C.H.R.R. D/858 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1982).
214. Aavik, 12 C.H.R.R. at D/409 (quoting Torres, 3 C.H.R.R. at D/861).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. For a review of the United States Supreme Court's development of this issue, see
supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
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not necessarily insulate that employer from liability," 21 9 and employ-
ers are not "automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors."
220
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN
RELATIONSHIP
The United States' influence on the development of Canadian
sexual harassment law is extensive. The Canadian courts have com-
monly considered and used United States case decisions as author-
ity.221 In contrast, United States courts have not used Canadian law
in fashioning their decisions.
The United States does not need to rely on Canadian authority
because it has many domestic tribunals generating persuasive case au-
thority. Yet, while the need may not exist, the value of considering
other jurisprudential authority from beyond United States borders re-
mains. Since Canadian tribunals regularly utilize persuasive United
States authority in conceptualizing Canadian sexual harassment law,
perhaps United States courts should look to Canadian decisions for
similar guidance.
This wider vision may benefit United States legal development.
The Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. 222 decision regarding employer
liability offers a good example. Coupled with the Canadian Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Robichaud v. The Queen,223 Janzen pro-
vides a sensible and constructive legal analysis. The Robichaud
Court's determination not to have the remedial objectives of the
human rights law "stultified" by a narrower approach to employer
liability is praiseworthy. 224 Perhaps the United States Supreme Court
will consider Canada's determination when ultimately advancing a
clear ruling on the standard of employer liability in sexual harassment
cases.
219. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
222. 59 D.L.R.4th 352 (1989) (Can.).
223. 40 D.L.R.4th 577 (1987) (Can.).
224. Id. at 584.
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APPENDIX
A LISTING OF CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS WITH
CITATION TO AND DESCRIPTION OF KEY ANTI-
WORKPLACE SEX DISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS
I. FEDERAL
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985),
amended by R.S.C., ch. 31 (1st Supp. 1985);
R.S.C., ch. 32 (2d Supp. 1985)
7. It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, (a) to refuse
to employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in the
course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an
employee, on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
3(1). For all purposes of this Act, race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, age, sex, marital status, disability and conviction
for which a pardon has been granted are prohibited grounds of
discrimination.
II. TERRITORIES
A. Northwest Territories
Fair Practices Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. F2 (1974), amended
by S.N.W.T., ch. 6 (3d Sess. 1981)
3(1). No employer shall refuse to employ, or to continue to em-
ploy, a person or adversely discriminate in any term or condition
of employment of any person because of race, creed, colour, sex,
marital status, nationality, ancestry, place of origin, handicap, age
or family of that person or because of a conviction of that person
for which a pardon has been granted.
B. Yukon Territory
Human Rights Act, S.Y.T., ch. 3 (1987)
8. No person shall discriminate . . . (b) in connection with any
aspect of employment or application for employment.
6. It is discrimination to treat any individual or group un-
favourably on any of the following grounds: . . . (f) sex, including
pregnancy, and pregnancy related conditions.
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III. PROVINCES
A. Alberta
The Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A., ch. 1-2
(1980), amended by S.A., ch. 33 (1985)
7(1). No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall
(a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ any person, or
(b) discriminate against any person with regard to employment or
any term or condition of employment, because of the race, reli-
gious beliefs, colour, sex, physical disability, marital status, age,
ancestry or place of origin of that person or of any other person.
B. British Columbia
Human Rights Act, S.B.C., ch. 22 (1984)
8(1). No person or anyone acting on his behalf shall (a) refuse to
employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discrimi-
nate against a person with respect to employment or any term or
condition of employment, because of the race, colour, ancestry,
place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, physical or
mental disability, sex or age of that person or because of his convic-
tion for a criminal or summary conviction charge that is unrelated
to the employment or to the intended employment of that person.
C. Manitoba
The Human Rights Code, S.M., ch. 45 (1987-88)
14(1). No person shall discriminate with respect to any aspect of an
employment or occupation, unless the discrimination is based upon
bona fide and reasonable requirements or qualifications for the em-
ployment or occupation.
9(1). In this Code, "discrimination" means . . . (b) differential
treatment of an individual or group on the basis of any characteris-
tic referred to in subsection (2).
9(2). The applicable characteristics for the purposes of clauses l(b)
to (d) are ... (f) sex, including pregnancy, the possibility of preg-
nancy, or circumstances related to pregnancy.
D. New Brunswick
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B., ch. H-11 (1973), amended
by S.N.B., ch. 31 (1976); S.N.B., ch. 30 (1985)
3(1). No employer, employers' organization or other person acting
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on behalf of an employer shall (a) refuse to employ or continue to
employ any person, or (b) discriminate against any person in re-
spect of employment or any term or condition of employment, be-
cause of race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry, place of
origin, age, physical disability, mental disability, marital status or
sex.
E. Newfoundland
The Human Rights Code, S. Nfld., ch. 62 (1988)
10(1). No employer, or person acting on behalf of an employer,
shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ or otherwise dis-
criminate against a person in regard to employment or a term or
condition of employment because of (a) that person's race, religion,
religious creed, political opinion, colour or ethnic, national or so-
cial origin, sex, marital status, physical disability or mental disabil-
ity; ... but this subsection does not apply to the expression of a
limitation, specification or preference based on a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification.
F Nova Scotia
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 214 (1989)
12(1). No person shall deny to, or discriminate against, an individ-
ual or class of individuals, because of the sex of the individual or
class of individuals, in providing or refusing to provide any of the
following: ... (d) employment, conditions of employment or con-
tinuing employment, or the use of application forms or advertising
for employment, unless there is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion based on sex.
G. Ontario
Human Rights Code, S.O., ch. 53 (1981), amended by
S.O., ch. 64, § 18 (1986)
4(1). Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to
employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry,
place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual
orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or
handicap.
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H. Prince Edward Island
Human Rights Act, S.P.E.I., ch. 72 (1975), amended by
S.P.E.I., ch. 26 (1980); S.P.E.I., ch. 23 (1985)
6(1). No person shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ
any individual on a discriminatory basis or discriminate in any
term or condition of employment.
1(1). In this Act... (d) "discrimination" means discrimination in
relation to the race, religion, creed, colour, sex, marital status, eth-
nic or national origin, age, physical or mental handicap or political
belief as registered under section 24 of the Election Act R.S.P.E.I.
1974, Chap. E-1 of any individual or class of individuals.
I Qudbec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12
(1977), amended by S.Q., ch. 7, § 112 (1978);
S.Q., ch. 11, § 34 (1980); S.Q., ch.
61 (1982)
16. No one may practise discrimination in respect of the hiring,
apprenticeship, duration of the probationary period, vocational
training, promotion, transfer, displacement, laying-off, suspension,
dismissal or conditions of employment of a person or in the estab-
lishment of categories or classes of employment.
10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exer-
cise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclu-
sion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual
orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion,
political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social
condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a
handicap.
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or
preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.
J. Saskatchewan
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S., ch. S-24.1
(1979), amended by S.S., ch. 23 (1989)
16(1). No employer shall refuse to employ or continue to employ
or otherwise discriminate against any person or class of persons
with respect to employment, or any term or condition of employ-
ment, because of his or their race, creed, religion, colour, sex, mari-
tal status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry or place of origin.
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